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ABSTRACT 
 
Daniel Hausman and James Woodward claim to prove that the causal Markov condition, 
so important to Bayes-nets methods for causal inference, is the ‘flip side’ of an important 
metaphysical fact about causation – that causes can be used to manipulate their effects. 
This paper disagrees. First, the premise of their proof does not demand that causes can be 
used to manipulate their effects but rather that if a relation passes a certain specific kind 
of test, it is causal. Second, the proof is invalid. Third, the kind of testability they require 
can easily be had without the causal Markov condition. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Metaphysics and methodology should go hand-in-hand. Metaphysics tells us what 
something is; methodology, how to find out about it. Our methods must be justified by 
showing that they are indeed a good way to find out about the thing under study, given 
what it is. Conversely, if our metaphysical account does not tie in with our best methods 
for finding out, we should be suspicious of our metaphysics. 
 Daniel Hausman and James Woodward try to forge just such a connection in their 
work on causation. They claim that the central characterizing feature of causation has to 
do with manipulability and invariance under intervention. They then use this to defend 
the causal Markov condition (CMC), which is a key assumption in the powerful Bayes-
nets methods for causal inference. In their own words, ‘…the view that causes can in 
principle be used to control their effects lends support to the causal Markov condition…’ 
(Hausman and Woodward [2003], ms p. 1). This is an important project and, to my mind, 
a model of the kind of thing we should be trying to do. Their first attempt to prove a link 
between manipulability and CMC (Hausman and Woodward [1999]) had a number of 
problems however (see Cartwright [2002]). Unfortunately, so too does their latest 
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attempt, ‘Modularity and the Causal Markov Condition’ (hereafter M&CMC) (Hausman 
and Woodward [2003]).  
 Although the connection they picture is just the kind we need between metaphysics 
and method, this particular link just isn’t there. The first reason is that the  premise they 
start from has nothing to do with the fact that causes can be used to control their effects. 
Instead it, at best,1 lays out a sufficient condition for inferring a causal relation in ideal 
experimental tests; and taking such a condition as part of the metaphysics of causality, as 
central to the very idea of causality, smacks too much of operationalism. The most blatant 
of  the problems with their project in M&CMC, however, is that the proof is not valid, at 
least under what seems to me the most natural reading of it. On a second reading, the 
premise is blatantly false and on a third, the proof is again invalid.  
 I shall explain the problems with the proof after a review of the switch they have 
made in their work from taking control, or manipulability, to taking a sufficient condition 
for inferring a causal relation in an experimental test as the starting point. The final 
discussion will focus on cases of probabilistic causality. When causes can act 
probabilistically, CMC will be violated in any case where causes produce  by-products in 
tandem with their main effects. Hausman and Woodward maintain that causes can’t do 
that. I shall defend my view that there is nothing to stop them from doing so.   
 First a definition and some notation. The causal Markov condition is formulated 
relative to a population Φ, a set of random variables V  on that population, a set of 
random variables U representing omitted causes of features represented in V  sufficient in 
combination with the variables in V  to fix the values (or, for indeterministic cases, the 
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chances) of every variable in V, a probability measure P over V + U , and a directed graph 
G of the causal relations among the features represented by variables in V + U2: 
 
CMC: Φ,V,U,P,G satisfy CMC iff  for all Xi,Xj,  i≠j, in V , if Xi does not cause 
Xj, then Xi and Xj are probabilistically independent conditional on pai (i.e. 
Xi┴Xj/pai), 
 
where pai is the set of direct causes, or parents, of Xi relative to V  and G .  
 As to notation, throughout I shall use XcÆY  to mean that X causes Y and X c= f(…) 
to indicate that the factors in the function on the right-hand side cause those on the left 
and that the functional equality holds, where in both cases generic-level as opposed to 
singular causation is intended. I shall denote members of V  by Xi or Yi, values of 
variables by lower case versions of the letter representing the variable, and a member of 
U that causes Xi by Uij. Following Hausman and Woodward, I shall use Ui′ to represent 
the net causal effect on Xi of a minimal set of omitted causes of Xi  that in combination 
with the parents of Xi are sufficient to fix the value (or for indeterministic cases, the 
chance) of Xi. A┴B/C means that A is probabilistically independent of B conditional on 
C. 
 Hausman and Woodward treat CMC for purely deterministic causality and for  purely 
probabilistic causality in one fell swoop. I shall divide my discussion to focus on 
different aspects of the proof.  
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2 Earlier views: manipulability v testability 
 
Hausman and Woodward have long defended the idea that modularity is a characterizing 
feature of causality and this term appears in the title of the paper with the new proof – 
‘Modularity and the Causal Markov Condition’. In much of their earlier work modularity 
was intimately connected with claims that at the heart of causation is the idea that 
something is a cause just when it can be used to control the putative effect.  I want here to 
review the earlier ideas to make clear that their new proof does not link CMC with 
modularity as we first saw them talking about it. Nor do they claim so when they write 
down their central premise in M&CMC. Still, it is easy to be misled since they retain the 
earlier language as well as a number of the earlier slogans, such as the one quoted in 
section 1 above claiming that the fact that causes can be used to control their effects 
supports CMC. 
 I shall not start by defining modularity because I think some of the arguments in their 
earlier work, including the paper where the earlier proof appears, speak to a somewhat 
different thesis than the one they formally state as MOD in the earlier proof.3 Rather I 
shall describe two motivations for modularity we can find in their work, motivations that 
lead to different conditions.    
 
1. Manipulability: It is essential to causality4 that causes can be used to manipulate their 
effects.5 So  (roughly)… 
 
 
(XcÆY) Æ there is  some way (they call it an ‘intervention’ or sometimes a 
‘manipulation’) to change X so that Y changes. 
 
Both  ‘intervention’ and ‘manipulation’ suggest human agency and indeed for many 
philosophers that has been important. This, however, is not part of Hausman and 
Woodward’s programme. What they require is not that a cause be manipulable by us in 
the right ways but merely that it be possible that the cause vary in the right ways, whether 
we vary it or not. This is a theme familiar from the literature on natural experiments – 
i.e., situations in which one factor varies naturally, without our help, in just the right way 
to count as a test for causality. Hausman and Woodward are explicit that human agency is 
not required. Nevertheless ‘manipulation’ and ‘intervention’ are the words they regularly 
use rather than a more neutral description in terms of  variation. So we must be careful to 
focus on the definitions themselves and not the labels. 
 Even with this understanding of what ‘manipulability’ means, the condition  seems 
far too strong. If a cause can vary in the right way, then (for the most part6) we can expect 
its effects to change in train. But there is no guarantee that such variation is always 
possible.7 
 
2. Testability:  In discussing the chemical factory example described below in Section 9, 
Hausman and Woodward take it to be an advantage of their view that it allows one ‘to 
disentangle different possibilities concerning the causal structure of the situation. If one 
thinks of the example as one in which the effects cannot, even in principle, be separately 
interfered with, the example does not really have a common cause structure, but is rather 
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one in which a single mechanism links [the putative common cause] to X [one putative 
effect] and Y [the other putative effect]’ (Hausman and Woodward [2003], ms p.14). 
Thus, it seems, the case would not have a common cause structure if there were no 
interventions possible on X and Y, at least in principle, that would allow us to determine 
that it does, and to do so by showing that X does not cause Y nor the reverse. This 
suggests that they want to require that for every possible causal connection, Xc Æ Y, 
there should be (at least in principle) an intervention on X that would show whether it 
holds or not. 
 This suggestion is supported by the kinds of arguments about causal mechanisms that 
they repeatedly offer in defence of modularity. Each causal principle is to represent a 
separate mechanism for the production of some given effect X. But there is no separate 
mechanism for X unless it is possible to intervene on X without changing any other 
causal principles. So again, it looks as if for every possible effect X there must be a 
possible intervention, and presumably this intervention should leave P(Y) unchanged if X 
does not cause Y since the intervention is supposed to have no effect on any other 
mechanisms, either to add, subtract or change them. Again this demand is tantamount to a 
condition that each possible causal claim be testable, and testable by what I shall call 
‘experiment’: intervene and see what happens. 
 So, the requirement of testability by experiment provides a second distinct way to 
formulate a modularity requirement. Using the notation and formulations of M&CMC, 
we have: 
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For all Φ,V,U,P,G, and Xi in V, there is a Zi in V + U  such that  Zi is an 
intervention on Xi and ∀Xj¬ (  iff  P(X)ji XcX → j/Zi=on) = P (Xj/Zi=off).8 
 
This requires explanation.  
 
Zi in V + U is an intervention on Xi relative to Φ,V,U,G iff  
(i) Zi causes Xi on G 
(ii) Zi is not caused on G by any of the other variables in V + U 
(iii)Zi does not on G cause any members of U  and has no causes in common with 
any members of U  or other Z′s on G  
(iv) For all Xj, j≠i, if Zi or any cause of Zi causes Xj on G, then it does so only via 
a path passing through Zi and Xi first 
(v)If Xi is deterministically caused on G,P, then for some range of values of Zi, 
zi*, if Zi = zi* in zi*, then Xi = xi* regardless of the values of any other members 
of  V + U. If Xi is indeterministically caused, then for some range of values of Zi, 
zi*, if Zi = zi* in zi*,  P(Xi) = Pi* regardless of the values of any other members of  
V + U.  For other values of Zi, Xi or P(Xi) is a function of pai and members of  U .  
 
The values in zi* are designated as the on values for Zi. So the condition says that for 
every variable Xi there always is an intervention and that the probability of any other 
variable Xj changes when Xi is intervened on iff Xi causes Xj.  
 What is important to notice is that testability is stronger than manipulability in two  
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ways: 
 
• Testability requires that there exists an ‘intervener’/‘manipulation’ for every 
factor, not just for causes. 
• Under testability, manipulating a cause changes its effects; but also manipulating 
non-causes of a factor does not change it. 
 
I think that Hausman and Woodward’s views on causal mechanisms and interventions 
commit themselves to something like testability by experiment. As an attempt to motivate 
modularity, testability also has the advantage over manipulability that it has the arrows of 
implication going the right way. Manipulability says that if X Æ Y then intervening on X 
changes Y. The assumption they call MOD*, which is the premise in their argument for 
CMC, instead requires that if ¬(Xc Æ Y) then intervening on X does not change Y, 
which does follow from testability by experiment. To the extent that I am right, this is 
extremely restrictive: it not only requires that causal relations, in order to be causal, must 
each be ascertainable by us, but moreover that they be ascertainable by one specific 
method among the many that we use (like various ‘mark methods’). This is 
operationalism pushed beyond its limits. 
 These two considerations lead me to 
 
Conclusion 1: Modularity in the form of either the manipulation or the testability 
thesis is too strong a condition to characterize causality.  
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 3 Increasingly weaker theses 
 
For the latest proof Hausman and Woodward do not start from testability but from a far 
weaker assumption about the metaphysics of causality. Why? Testability tells us that for 
every V and every Xi in V  there is an intervention Zi for Xi and Zi changes Xj iff 
XicÆXj.9 This is too strong for at least two reasons: 
 
¾ There isn’t always such a Zi. (This is my explanation; they don’t themselves 
say this.) 
¾ The ‘iff’ is too strong. If Xi both causes and prevents Xj then Xj need not 
change as Xi does. (They do say this, though, as I argue in section 4, I do not 
think they need to.) 
 
What they propose instead in M&CMC is this:  MOD* ‘says that when Xi does not cause 
Xj, then the probability distribution of Xj is unchanged when there is an intervention with 
respect to Xi’ (Hausman and Woodward [2003], ms p. 3). So, roughly, (for a more 
precise statement, see section 5) 
 
 if  Zi is an intervention for Xi then (Xj or P(Xj) changes under Zi) → (XicÆXj) 
 
We should note that this gives up on 
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¾ The claim that the possibility of full testability is necessary for the 
applicability of causal concepts 
¾ The claim that it must be possible to use a cause to manipulate its effects 
 
and it does so in two ways 
 
• It is no longer necessary that an intervention on Xi exist in order for Xi to cause 
some other factor. 
• It does not require that manipulating a cause changes the effect but rather that if 
Xi does not cause Xj then manipulating Xi will not change Xj. 
 
 MOD* (or rather some more precise version of it as I discuss below) is the premise in 
Hausman and Woodward’s new proof of CMC. So it seems they do not link 
manipulability with the causal Markov condition, but at best only a claim about one  test 
that can guarantee that a causal relation holds.  Nor do they deny this: in M&CMC they 
conclude ‘The causal Markov condition is a doppelganger for  invariance to 
intervention’(Hausman and Woodward [2003], ms p 7, my italics).  Still, they call the 
section with the proof, ‘Causation and Manipulation’ (my italics) and begin it with 
 
When X causes Y and one can intervene to change the value of X, one can use 
one’s knowledge of the causal relation to influence the value of Y…This is an 
extremely important feature of causation. One way to formulate a connection 
between causation and manipulability… is to say that if an intervention with 
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respect to Xi changes the probability distribution of some other variable Xj, then 
Xi causes Xj. (Hausman and Woodward [2003], ms p. 2.) 
 
Given that their central premise is MOD*, their proof may connect something about 
manipulability with causation but 
 
¾ The proof in M&CMC does not connect the claim ‘Causes can always be 
manipulated to affect their effects’ with causation  
¾ Nor the weaker claim ‘If a cause can be manipulated (in the right way), the 
effect is changed’. 
 
That’s because MOD* says that if we manipulate a factor that is not a cause of another, 
the other does not change. 
 From this consideration and others in this section and the last I draw 
 
Conclusion 2: The premise (MOD*) in their proof is not manipulability but at best 
one test that, if it can be applied and if it is passed, can guarantee that one factor 
causes another. 
 
 
 
4 The proof is invalid 
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There are two points we need to beware of –  
 
¾ The earlier Hausman and Woodward proof used the strong premise that for 
every Xi in V there is an intervention Zi and manipulating Zi leaves Xj 
unaffected if ¬(Xi cÆ Xj). The earlier proof didn’t work. The new proof has a 
weaker premise. How can it work? 
¾ One would think that whether the probability of a non-effect of Xi, Xj, is left 
the same under an intervention on Xi will depend on whether the intervention 
on Xi is probabilistically dependent on  any causes of Xj. Such dependencies 
are often prohibited by definition of ‘intervention’. But not so for Hausman 
and Woodward. How can they get by without this? 
 
Let me recall a well-known result:   
 
 For any V,  {Ui'} are independent of each other in all combinations Æ CMC.  
 
So when are the U′’s independent? Here is one common hypothesis:  
 
CM1: factors that are not causally connected are independent in all combinations. 
(X is causally connected with Y iff XcÆY or the reverse or they have a common 
cause.) 
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If V  is causally sufficient, the Uij’s will be causally unconnected and hence given CM1 
independent in all combinations. This rules out ‘brute correlations’ that have no causal 
explanation, like   
 
1. Elliott Sober’s case of bread prices in Britain and sea levels in Venice (Sober 
[2001]). 
2. Any case with time trends. 
 
 In their new proof Hausman and Woodward do not assume CM1. So how do they 
rule out probabilistic dependencies that are incompatible with CMC? They think they can 
do so using MOD* plus two other assumptions, where more precisely stated 
 
Φ,V,U,P,G satisfy MOD* iff for every Xi in V and every intervention Zi in V+ U 
on Xi,  Zi┴Xj for any Xj such that ¬(XicÆXj). 
 
Notice that as I have written it, MOD* is a condition that a system might satisfy, not a 
claim. So too is CMC. I shall be concerned about what claims Hausman and Woodward 
want to assert. One claim that many favour is that any representative causally sufficient 
system, Φ,V,U,P,G, satisfies CMC. Hausman and Woodward say, ‘We shall show that 
MOD* …[and some other assumptions] … imply CMC.’ (Hausman and Woodward 
[2003], ms p. 3) The most natural reading of this is that any system that satisfies MOD* 
plus the other assumptions satisfies CMC, and this is what I shall suppose they mean. 
 The two other assumptions for the case of determinism are 
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 A.  ‘[A]ll the variables in V are distinct, … we are dealing with the right 
variables, and … selection bias and other sources of unrepresentativeness…are 
absent’ (Hausman and Woodward [2003], ms p. 2) 
 B.  V  is causally sufficient. 
So, 
H-W claim1: for any Φ,G,V ,U,P,  if  A., B. and MOD* hold for Φ,G,V ,U,P, then 
CMC holds for Φ,G,V ,U,P. 
 
Here is how their proof  proceeds: 
 
• Define ‘intervention’ so that interventions on Xi are causally unconnected with Uj′ 
if Xi does not cause Xj  
• Show that in a certain subpopulation – the subpopulation where pai is fixed –  Ui′ 
satisfies the definition of an intervention. 
• Use MOD* to claim that in this population Ui′┴Xj; i.e. Ui′┴Xj/pai 
• It follows, they say, that Xi┴Xj/pai 
 
 But the proof must be invalid since there are cases that satisfy the premises but where 
CMC fails. Consider Graph 1 for some population Φ that satisfies A., B. and MOD* and 
for which Xi c= aiY + Ui′ (ai ≠ 0) and for which U1 and U2 are dependent conditional on 
Y. This system is inconsistent with CMC. (A dotted line indicates probabilistic 
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dependence; a dotted line with a y through it, dependence conditional on Y; a dotted line 
with a slash through it, independence. In this example it makes no difference whether U1’ 
⊥ U2’.)10 
Graph 1 
   
 
In Graph 1 MOD* is satisfied: there is no factor in V +U that sets the value of Xi, hence 
no intervention, so MOD* holds vacuously.  
 It is worth rehearsing just why the proof is invalid. The theorem we wish to prove 
says that if a given population Φ and a given probability P11 satisfy MOD* then that 
population and that probability satisfy CMC (for Xi, Xj such that ¬(Xi cÆXj). Hausman 
and Woodward’s argument establishes that if MOD* for some different population Φ’ 
and different probability measure P’, then CMC holds for Φ. (The population Φ’ is the 
subpopulation in which pαi is fixed and P’(…) = P(…|pαi). 
 We can thus draw 
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Conclusion 4: The proof is invalid under the most natural reading of Hausman 
and Woodward’s claim. 
 
 
5 MOD* is implausible 
 
We can also use Graph 1 to illustrate how strange the condition MOD* is, independent of 
its connection with CMC. Compare Graph 1 and Graph 2. 
 
Graph 2 
   
For Graph 2 suppose, as with Graph 1, that  Xi c= aiYi + Ui' and A. and B. are satisfied. 
But for Graph 2 imagine that ai = 0 and that U1'┴U2' as MOD* requires.  So, MOD* 
allows U1 and U2 to be probabilistically dependent in Graph 1 but prohibits it in Graph 2.  
 That seems to require a completely ad hoc distinction between the two cases. Suppose 
we start with a situation appropriately represented by Graph 1, with U1' and U2' 
probabilistically dependent. Consider a situation identical with this except that Y’s 
influence on X1 and X2 is just slightly less (i.e. a1 and a2 are slightly smaller). MOD* 
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does not prohibit this new situation either. Now consider a series of situations in each one 
of which Y’s influence on the X’s is smaller than in the one before. Still MOD* does not 
prohibit the U'’s from being dependent. This is true no matter how small Y’s influence on 
the X’s becomes, so long as it has any influence at all. But as soon as the influence 
disappears altogether (a1 = 0 = a2), suddenly under MOD* the U'’s must be independent. 
What is responsible for this sudden jump? 
 We may even suppose that the diminutions of Y’s influence occur across time in the 
very same physical system. Gradually Y’s powers to influence X1 and X2 give out. What 
would ensure, when Y’s influence finally disappears altogether, that suddenly U1' 
becomes independent of U2'?  I see nothing that could. 
 Here is an example (or rather, a caricature of an example). Suppose Elliott Sober is 
correct that bread prices in England  are probabilistically dependent on Venetian sea 
levels. We can suppose that the real levels of these two variables in combination with the 
measurement apparatuses employed (call this combination U1 for sea levels and U2 for 
bread prices) are each a central cause of the respective measured values of the levels (X1 
and X2); presumably so too will be the skill of the persons taking the measurements. For 
the sake of an example let us suppose that there is one team of experts that make both 
such measurements and that every ten years more and more automated technology is 
introduced in both places so that gradually the results depend less and less on the skills of 
the measurement team(Y). We can suppose that U1 and U2 are probabilistically 
dependent because by hypothesis bread prices and sea levels are dependent. This is 
consistent with MOD* so long as skills matter. But as soon as the measurement process 
becomes fully automated and the skills of the team have no influence on the measured 
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values, suddenly bread prices and sea levels, which were dependent until then, must 
become independent if MOD* is to be satisfied. I don’t see why this kind of thing should 
happen.  
 Of course if we assume CM1, bread prices and sea levels will not be dependent in the 
first place. But recall that Hausman and Woodward do not assume CM1. And that is all to 
the good given their overall programme because, given CM1 and their other assumptions, 
CMC follows without assuming MOD*, so no argument is at hand that MOD* supports 
CMC. MOD* is supposed to replace CM1 and provide an independent basis for CMC. 
Even if the proof were valid, I do not think that this would be a very sensible basis since, 
as I have just been arguing 
 
Conclusion 5: MOD* is highly implausible unless dependencies between causally 
unconnected quantities are already ruled out in the first place. 
  
 
6 Two alternative claims and their defects 
 
Let us try some other formulations of Hausman and Woodward’s claim to see if they fare 
better. For their proof they need MOD*  to hold in the specific population in which the 
parents of Xi take a fixed value. Perhaps then they intend that MOD* should hold in 
every population and hence in the requisite one:  
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H-W claim2: if  MOD* holds for every Φ,V,U,G,P such that V  is causally 
sufficient relative to G and P, then CMC holds as well for every Φ,V,U,G,P such 
that V  is causally sufficient.  
 
Given the antecedent, it is true that for any population, in the subpopulation where the 
parents of Xi take fixed values,  Ui′┴Xj; i.e. for every population, Ui′┴Xj/pai. The 
consequent then follows that CMC holds for every population. Graph 1 is no longer a 
counterexample, since by inspection we can see that there is a population – the 
subpopulation of Φ picked out by fixing a value for Y – for which MOD* is violated; this 
is ruled out by the antecedent of the reformulated claim.  
 But the antecedent for this formulation is altogether too strong: it does not hold for a 
vast array of perfectly ordinary situations, including a host of ones in which CMC is 
satisfied. Consider, for example, a population Φ with probability measure P in which 
(where causes on the right-hand-side) 
 
Y ↔ X1 or X2 
X1↔ U1′;  
X2↔ U2′;  
U1′┴U2′;  
¬(X1cÆX2) 
P(U1′) = P(U1′/U2′) = P(U1′/U2′&X2&Y) = r ≠ 1. 
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where all the variables are dichotomous. For this population CMC holds.  
 Consider next a second population, Φ′ – the subpopulation of Φ picked out by +Y.  In 
this subpopulation U1′ sets the value of X1, but P(U1′/¬X2&+Y) = 1≠ P(U1′/X2&+Y). 
So ¬(U1′┴X2) in Φ’, as illustrated in Graph 3. 
 
Graph 3  for subpopulation +Y: 
 
Or look again at Graph 2 and consider the subpopulation in which ¬X1 v X2. In this 
population U1′ is still an intervention on X1 and X1 still does not cause X2, yet 
P(X2/U1′=on) = 1 ≠ P (X2/U1′=off). 
 It is, however, almost certain that Hausman and Woodward do not wish to formulate 
their claim in this way. After all, the populations in my examples are unrepresentative 
relative to the larger populations from which they are drawn, and we see by condition A. 
that in their proof of CMC they assume that ‘selection bias and other sources of 
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unrepresentativeness’ are absent. Certainly my subpopulations suffer from ‘selection 
bias’. So let us try instead 
 
H-W claim3: if  MOD* holds for every Φ,V,U,G,P such that V  is causally 
sufficient relative and Φ is representative, then CMC holds as well for every 
Φ,V ,U,G,P such that V  is causally sufficient and Φ is representative. 
 
The antecedent in this formulation is more plausible. But it undermines the argument that 
Hausman and Woodward wish to make in establishing the consequent. The 
subpopulations selected by fixing values of pai are themselves unrepresentative, and it is  
just these populations in which MOD* must hold if CMC is to be deducible in the 
manner they suggest. There is a central unresolved issue about how to define ‘selection 
bias’ and ‘unrepresentative’. I myself think that it is very difficult to do for purposes of 
defending CMC in general. In this case in particular I see no promise for defining it in a 
way that is not ad hoc and yet counts all unrepresentative subpopulations as biased except 
those selected by pai for each Xi is any variable set we may wish to consider. 
 I am thus led to  
 
Conclusion 6: Of the two alternative plausible readings, the first claim has a 
blatantly false premise and the second has no valid argument to support it. 
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7 A true claim and a valid argument 
 
A more direct approach would be to formulate the thesis to say explicitly what is required 
for Hausman and Woodward’s proof:   
 
H-W claim4: for every Φ,V,U,G,P, if 
(i) for all Xi and all assignments of  values, paik , to the parents of Xi in G, (Φik,V , 
U,G(paik),P(paik) satisfies MOD*) 
(ii) P(paik)(--) = P(--/paik) and G(paik) = G 
(iii) V  is causally sufficient 
then  Φ,V,U,G,P satisfies CMC, 
 
where G(paik) is a graph of the causal relations over U+ V in the subpopulation of Φ in 
which the parents of Xi take the values paik, and P(paik)(--) is the probability distribution 
over U+ V  in that same subpopulation.  
 H-W claim4 is true and the argument that Hausman and Woodward give in M&CMC 
shows that it is valid. But it does not gain Hausman and Woodward what they want – a 
route from manipulability/testability to CMC, for three reasons: 
 
1. Claim1 – the claim Hausman and Woodward seem to make, that any representative 
causally sufficient system that satisfies MOD* also satisfies CMC –  is an interesting and 
surprising claim. Claim4 is not. It tells us that it a very special set of unrepresentative 
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populations, all subpopulations of Φ, satisfy MOD* then Φ will satisfy CMC. Now this 
may seem to be some gain, but I am afraid that it is very little, and it is certainly not the 
gain I had hoped for in connecting metaphysics and methods. For we have little reason 
for accepting that the premise should be true of any given population than we would for 
expecting CMC in the first place. We could think that these very special populations 
satisfy MOD* because all populations do, and they do because manipulability is essential 
to causality. We have seen that does not work because MOD* rests on testability not 
manipulability.  
 So what if we were to suppose that testability is the form MOD* itself is essential to 
causality? This still gets us nowhere in the proof for it takes us back to Claim3, and we 
have seen the problems with the premise in Claim3. It is false that MOD* holds for all 
populations: the unrepresentative picked out by +Y in Graph 3 shows that. But if the 
premise is restricted to all representative populations, the argument does not go through. 
For a valid proof we need to suppose that MOD* applies for just the right special set of 
unrepresentative populations. I do not find any independent reason for that in Hausman 
and Woodward’s discussions. 
 
2. The problem pointed out in section 6 still arises. V  is causally sufficient but we do not 
presume from this that the U′’s are independent. Nor do we suppose CM1 to ensure they 
are independent. That is, they are not independent because they are causally unconnected 
– that it seems is not enough. But when we add that they set the values for quantities 
represented in V , that is enough. But why? 
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3. The claim does not after all connect testability with CMC. Rather, it lays down very 
strong constraints on the populations, variable sets and graphs for which CMC is derived, 
and these constraints are strong enough to ensure both testability and CMC. This is 
exactly the same kind of problem that beset their earlier proof. We have a set of 
constraints C; C implies testability and C implies CMC. Of course by logic then, in C, 
testability implies CMC. But that is because in C, anything implies CMC. It is the 
constraints that imply CMC, not testability. In this case the constraints are conditions (i) – 
(iii) in the antecedent of H-W claim4. 
 But isn’t constraint (i) itself an assertion of testability, and the inclusion of constraint 
(i) is essential to the truth of claim4, as we all admit? No, constraint (i) is not a reasonable 
assertion of testability: it guarantees testability, but is itself stronger and stronger in just 
the way necessary to guarantee CMC. 
 Here is what I would take instead to be a reasonable statement of testability: 
 
V is c-testable in Φ relative to U,G,P iff for all Xi in V , there is an intervention Zi 
in V +U such that for all Xj [¬(XicÆXj) Æ  P(Xj/Zi=on) = P(Xj/Zi=off)]. 
 
I call this c-testability to stress that it is only one kind of testability – the kind we identify 
with a controlled test. As discussed in section 4, I myself would want to make the 
condition on the probabilities both necessary and sufficient for testability; but I do not do 
so here in order to stay as close as possible to Hausman and Woodward’s formulations. 
 Notice how c-testability for Φ,V,U,G,P differs from MOD*. In the first place, c-
testability requires that there be an intervention for every variable. On the other hand, it 
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does not require that everything that counts as an intervention on Hausman and 
Woodward’s definition should satisfy the independence assumption, merely that each 
variable has an intervention that does so. Hence nothing about c-testability automatically 
forces the U′’s to satisfy the requisite independence assumption. This is for the reasons I 
have rehearsed. In Hausman and Woodward’s scheme, we do not assume that a factor’s 
being causally unconnected with others in the right ways is sufficient for guaranteeing the 
independence assumption; adding that that factor sets the value for a variable in V does 
not seem to add any reason for it to do so. On the other hand, if there is such a factor for 
each variable, then any hypothesis about one variable in V  causing another can be 
tested.12  
 The point now is that MOD* (i.e. (i)), (ii) and (iii) guarantee c-testability as well as 
CMC. But c-testability in combination with (ii) and (iii) does not guarantee MOD*, nor 
CMC. That’s because testability does not require that intervention be via a U′ – it just 
requires there be some intervention for each variable, and that is compatible with the U′’s 
not being mutually independent.  Graph 4 shows a particularly simple case: 
 
Graph 4 
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The equations for the population Φ in Graph 4 are 
 
  X1 c= U11 v U12 
  X2  c= U21 v U22 
 
with P(i11U11, i12U12, i21U21, i22U22) = P(i11U11)P(i21U21)P(i22U22) if i12 = i21, and = 0 
otherwise, where ijk = +,¬ and P(i12U12) = P(i21U21). 
 In this case U11 is an intervention on X1: conditions (i) – (iv) in the definition of 
intervention are met by inspection and if U1 occurs – call that ‘on’ – , X1 occurs no matter 
what values other variables take, so (v) is met as well. Similarly U22 is an intervention on 
X2. Also, U11 v U12 is an intervention on X1 and U21 v U22 is an intervention on X2.  
P(X2/U11 is on) = P(X2/U11 is off) and P(X1/U22 is on) = P(X1/U22 is off). But 
P(X2/U11vU12 = on) ≠ P(X2/ U11vU12 = off) and P(X1/U21vU22 = on) ≠ P(X1/U21vU22). 
So V = {X1,X2} is c-testable in Φ relative to U={Uij),G,P. Conditions (ii) and (iii) of the 
antecedent of H-W claim4 are met as well. But condition (i) of that claim is not met and 
correlatively, CMC fails. C-testability obtains without the strong assumption needed for 
the true H-W claim and without CMC.  
 The claim I have formulated as H-W claim4 is the only one I have been able to 
construct that makes their basic argument valid. If I am right that that is the only claim 
supported by their argument, then… 
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Conclusion 7: Hausman and Woodward can, using their basic ideas, produce a 
true claim and a valid argument. But their argument does not show that testability 
implies CMC; rather the constraints they need imply both testability and CMC; 
without these constraints, c-testability does not imply CMC. 
 
 
8 Indeterminism 
 
So far I have discussed only the deterministic case. For indeterminism we need more 
because in the probabilistic case a cause may produce a product and a by-product – i.e. 
two effects in correlation – and in this case the causal Markov condition will be violated. 
I have suggested for instance that a factory might produce an unwanted pollutant as a 
side-effect during a purely probabilistic process that produces a desired chemical. In my 
comments on Hausman and Woodward’s proof I represented this example thus: 
 
X1 c= α1Y + U1 
X2 c= α2Y + U2  
P(+α1) = .8 = P(+α2) 
 
Here Y is the presence of the chemical factory process; X1, the presence of the chemical; 
X2 the presence of the pollutant; α1 and α2 the operation of the chemical factory process 
to produce the chemical and the pollutant respectively;13 and ‘[U1] and [U2] each satisfy 
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the requirements of an intervention’ (Cartwright [2002], p 436).14 Since the U′s satisfy 
the definition of an intervention, U1┴ X2 and U2┴X1, unconditionally and conditional 
on Y.  
 In the example there is a l00% correlation between the presence of the chemical and 
that of the pollutant and this correlation remains even when we condition on Y. The 
reason for the correlation is that Y produces the two in tandem; it produces one if and 
only if it produces the other (though any other correlation between 0 and 1 could be 
possible as well). The correlation need not confuse us about what is going on. Since the 
U′s satisfy the criteria of an intervention,  it is easy to test that the chemical is not causing 
the pollutant, nor the reverse; and supposing that Y can be intervened on as well, it is 
easy to test that the chemical process is causing both.  
 Hausman and Woodward maintain that this kind of case is impossible, at least at the 
macrolevel. The issue is about P(α1 α2). Can it, for instance, equal P(α1), so that the 
pollutant is a byproduct of the chemical – it is produced iff the chemical is produced? If 
causation must be deterministic, this can easily happen but then CMC will not be violated 
because all the relevant probabilities will equal one. But we had best not assume that 
causality must be deterministic or we won’t be able to say that what causes us to see the 
stars is the emission of photons that occurred on them long ago. So what happens when 
causation is probabilistic?  
 Hausman and Woodward maintain that it is impossible in this case for a cause to 
produce its effects together – it must produce one effect independently of the other. They 
argue that this is assumed on all standard accounts of causation. I do not agree. What 
kinds of things do we expect of causation in our various standard accounts? Here are a 
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few: a)Causes should make their effects happen. Y does that for both X1 and X2. b) In the 
nice cases where all probabilistic dependencies can be derived from the causal laws 
operating, MOD* should be satisfied. And it is. c) In many situations if we put a mark on 
the cause we expect to find a trace of the mark on the effect. There is no reason to think 
that we cannot mark Y and find a trace later on both X1 and X2. So causation in this case 
has a great many of the features we expect of it. 
 If causes can produce their effects in tandem, CMC is violated. To prove CMC, 
Hausman and Woodward rule this possibility out directly with a premise they call ‘no 
spontaneous correlation’: 
 
for every Φ,V,U,G,P and for every Xj ε V distinct from Xi, if  Xj┴Ui′, then Xj┴
Xi/pai. 
 
I of course reject this premise. I also think the name may be misleading. The correlations 
that remain between X1 and X2 given Y’s occurrence do not arise ‘spontaneously’ in the 
same sense in which time trends do or Sober’s correlations between Venetian sea levels 
and British bread prices. They arise from the occurrence of a cause and the way it 
operates. 
 This brings us to one of the nice features of Hausman and Woodward’s proof. They 
make very clear that even for causally sufficient variable sets, CMC could be violated for 
two different reasons: ‘brute’ dependencies not following from the causal principles 
governing the system as with time trends and bread prices and those due to causes 
producing their effects in tandem. They then offer separate cures for each: MOD* for the 
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first, no spontaneous correlations for the second. This is a strong point about their proof – 
this distinction is clearly drawn and the separate problems are ruled out by separate 
premises. As they intended, it makes it easy to see where disagreements lie. I clearly 
reject the second of these premises.  
 What about the first? Here I take issue with Hausman and Woodward’s discussion of 
my view. They spend a great deal of effort in reconstructing the factory example exactly 
as I presented it in my comments on their first proof. They then say, ‘…to the extent to 
which Cartwright is unwilling to commit herself to specific claims about what would 
happen under various interventions …, it seems to us she has not clearly specified the 
causal structure of the example’ (Hausman and Woodward [2003], ms p 14).15 But it is 
clear from the formulation what happens: intervene by manipulating U1 and X1 changes 
because U1 causes X1; X2 and P(X2) do not change because U2 and Y cause X2 and since 
U1 is an intervention, changes in it are supposed not to change U2 and Y since they are 
not effects of X1; P(X2/Y) does not change because U1┴ X2, unconditionally and 
conditional on Y; and of course P(X2/X1) does change. 
 Hausman and Woodward also say ‘Cartwright’s case that the chemical factory 
example is a genuine counterexample to [CMC] seems most plausible if one accepts 
MOD* …’ (Hausman and Woodward 2003, ms p. 14), suggesting by this and other 
remarks that I do not. To the contrary, I accept MOD* for a vast array of cases16 and I 
built the chemical factory formulation to satisfy it. As they say, we must be assuming 
MOD* or something like it every time we draw a causal conclusion from a controlled 
experiment. 
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 They also take issue with me for accepting in the case of the chemical factory that ‘It 
should make no difference to the value of [X1] whether we set [X2] [by intervention] or 
observe [X2] once we set the parents of [X1] [i.e., once we set Y by intervention]’ 
(Hausman and Woodward [2003], ms p. 19, fn 11) while rejecting their claim called PM2 
as it applies in the chemical factory case; PM2: P(X1/set-Y&X2) = P(X1/set-Y&set-X2). 
But it is right to accept the first for the chemical factory example and reject the second.  
 Imagine an occasion on which we set Y so Y must occur. Y occurs. On this occasion 
Y produces X1 and thus, since Y produces X1 iff Y produces X2, X2 occurs. If we also on 
this occasion intervene on X2 to make X2 occur, X2 will still occur – it will be 
overdetermined – and so will X1 occur. So whether we intervene on X2 will make no 
difference to the value of X1. Imagine on the other hand that Y does not produce X2, so 
X1 does not occur on this occasion. If we were to produce X2 by intervening, that won’t 
make Y suddenly produce X1 so X1 will still not occur. Again, whether we intervene on 
X2 will make no difference to the value of X1.  
 But the claim about probabilities doesn’t follow from the claim about values and is 
indeed false. The conditional probabilities of X1 change although the values never do for 
the usual reason. Imagine Y is set. Then when the intervention is off, all X2 occasions 
will be X1 occasions. But among the set-X2 occasions, only 80% will be X1 occasions; 
that’s true just because no ¬X1 occasion ever turns into an  X1 occasion just by turning  
the occasion from a ¬X2 one into an X2 one.  
 They also say that I cannot endorse the first claim and accept the arrow-breaking 
interpretation of intervention that they offer in their new proof and that I suppose in my 
chemical factory case. But that’s a mistake too. Perhaps Hausman and Woodward think 
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that intervening on X2 will interfere with Y’s operations, but obviously that shouldn’t be 
the case for an intervention. Setting U2 = 1 should leave Y’s operations unaffected. (Here 
we see some of the complications in defining ‘intervention’ – obviously in cases of 
probabilistic causality we want to ensure that an intervention on one variable doesn’t 
interfere with whether another would or would not produce its result on any occasion.). 
 In their discussion of product/by-product cases, Hausman and Woodward argue that 
‘the explication of causal claims in terms of what would happen under various 
hypothetical interventions does provide …an independent purchase [on the content of 
causal claims]’ (Hausman and Woodward [2003], ms p. 14). I agree that it does – so too 
do all the other theories of causation on offer and all the other methods (like the mark 
method) that we use to test for causality. But even if we took theirs as the central 
purchase, it does not help the case for CMC nor provide support for the no-spontaneous-
correlation premise since MOD* can be readily satisfied in cases where causes produce 
their effects in tandem.17 
 So I draw 
 
Conclusion 8: Product/by-product cases that violate CMC can be ruled out by a 
specially designed premise but that does not show much. And it is no help in 
establishing a route from testability to CMC. 
 
 
9 Overall conclusion 
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The route from manipulability/testability to CMC isn’t there. CMC is not a reflection of 
any important metaphysical facts about causation. And anyway, those putative facts 
about causation are not facts! 
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Footnotes 
1 See discussion in Section 6 for why I say ‘at best’. 
2 Usually it is said that the graph is over V , but often in practice U′s appear on the graphs 
as exogeneous causes. This is particularly important for Hausman and Woodward since 
in their proof  the interventions on variables in V  – which are supposed to be causes of 
the quantities represented by those variables – will be members of U. There is also the 
question of whether various concepts like intervention are defined relative to a graph or 
to ‘reality’. Since concepts central to CMC are defined relative to a graph, I think it is 
best to define all the concepts relative to a graph. (The alternative is at best very messy 
and certainly impossible without resorting to the concept of a ‘correct’ graph.) 
3 Cf. my discussion of MOD versus MOD# (Cartwright [2002], p. 417). 
4 Hausman claims that his work is intended to provide a boundary condition for the 
applicability of causal concepts. In this case my remark here should read, ‘It is essential 
to the correct application of “cause” that …’. Perhaps thereafter we need always to read 
‘Xc Æ Y’ as ‘It is correct to say that X causes Y.’ 
5 Cf Woodward’s principal claims/definitions in Woodward [2003], TC, DC and M. All 
state as necessary and sufficient condition for X to be some particular kind of cause of Y, 
that ‘there is a possible intervention on X that will change Y.’ Again, in [2003], p. 114, 
Woodward explains that ‘these conditions tell us what must be true of the relationship 
between X and Y if X causes Y…’ It is in this very same paragraph, however, that we see 
a withdrawal from the strong claims recorded in TC, DC and M, that causality requires 
that there be interventions: ‘ When we engage in causal inference regarding the effects of 
 36
                                                                                                                                                 
X in a situation in which there is no variable that satisfies all the conditions for an 
intervention variable with respect to X … we should think of ourselves as trying to 
determine what would happen in an ideal hypothetical experiment in which X is 
manipulated in such a way that the conditions in [the definition of intervention] are 
satisfied.’ [2003, p 114, ital. original] 
6 See caveat in next section. 
7 For a more extended discussion see Cartwright [2001]. 
8 Hausman and Woodward do not use the conditional probability, presumably because 
they do not wish to assume that the interventions themselves have a probability measure. 
But they need a measure over interventions to discuss MOD* since interventions are 
supposed to be probabilistically independent of various variables in V, so I assume 
throughout that there is a measure over V + U.   
9 They still maintain this thesis in places in M&CMC and still sometimes conflate it with 
the weaker MOD*. See footnote 13 below. 
10 In many treatments the situation pictured in Graph 1 is ruled out by CM1. But recall 
that Hausman and Woodward do not assume CM1. 
11 For brevity I here repress the other quantifiers and the other assumptions. 
12 We should make special note of this last as well, for it is a very strong notion of 
testability – we want to be able to test every single causal hypothesis about the variables 
in V. 
13 We need not be distracted about the issue of whether or not when an effect follows the 
occurrence of a purely probabilistic cause we should think that there is an additional 
event of the cause’s ‘firing’ or ‘producing’ the effect. If we do not want to admit these 
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kinds of events, we can take the α’s to be mere notational devices that allow us to 
represent causal claims-cum-probability distributions  as equations. 
14 The requirements for an intervention are slightly different in the new paper from any 
versions in the old. For the definition in the new paper I am not quite sure how they 
envisage writing equations where some of the U’s are interventions. Perhaps Y c= δZ 
(ΣaiXi + Uy)  + y*Z for some chosen value y* of Y, where  δZ = 1 when Z (ε U) = 0 (ie, Z 
= off) and  δZ = 0 when Z = 1. The exact formulation doesn’t matter though, since I began 
my formulation with a perfectly standard deterministic case where the U’s satisfied the 
requirements for an intervention, whatever Hausman and Woodward wanted these 
requirements to be, then simply changed the operation of the factory from one that 
produced the chemical and the pollutant deterministically to one that produced  them 
probabilistically, leaving intact from the previous deterministic case any alternative 
factors that can intervene and create the chemical or the pollutant independently of the 
action of any other causes.   
15 Sometimes I think Hausman and Woodward conflate the issue of whether there are 
interventions (as defined in any of the ways they propose) that can set the values (or 
probabilities) of the chemical and pollutant independently of what other causes for them 
are doing with the question of whether it is possible to stop Y itself from causing X1 
without stopping it from causing X2 . The formulation I gave is explicit about the first – 
which is what matters for MOD* and for tests of whether, for example, the chemical 
causes the pollutant or not (i.e., in their language, for ‘disentangling’ the common cause 
explanation of the correlation between chemical and pollutant from a direct cause 
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account), but my formulation is silent about the second. The answer would presumably 
differ from one case to another, depending on the facts of the situation. 
16 Though not all cases. I think brute correlations  may well occur in many situations; we 
want to be sure they aren’t happening whenever we draw causal conclusions from 
correlations. 
17 Hausman and Woodward also, in passing, try to defend the view that it should be 
possible to manipulate each factor separately – that is, that intervention is always 
possible. They do so by attacking my claim that equations that provide information about 
a full set of causes need not also provide information about what can and cannot be 
manipulated separately. Their argument is just their argument in favour of MOD* -- ‘in 
the absence of modularity there will be changes in the values of variables under 
interventions on other variables that are not reflected in the causal claims expressed in the 
system of equations.’ (Hausman and Woodward [2003], ms p. 13). This argument is 
invalid since the premise supports MOD*, which states what happens if intervention 
occurs, but the conclusion is that intervention is always possible.   
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